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
DIRECTORATE OF  
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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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
# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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
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CAMBODIA: Government efforts to induce Khmer Communist forces to rally have made no real progress.

In the month since Phnom Penh placed renewed emphasis on a widespread rallier program, there have been no instances of sizable numbers of indigenous insurgents responding to the government's appeals. Brigadier General Lon Non, the cabinet official responsible for the program, recently admitted that it has been a failure to date, but said he was determined to find ways to make it more effective.

The rallier program still stands as Lon Nol's primary political solution to the Khmer Communist problem. A number of prominent Cambodians both in and out of the government, however, have criticized the president's approach as basically unrealistic.

Leading civilian oppositionists In Tam and Sirik Matak have indicated a willingness to allow Khmer Communist participation in general elections. For the time being, however, Lon Nol probably will be reluctant to give any serious consideration to such suggestions.

The Khmer Communists are maintaining an equally intransigent attitude toward Phnom Penh, repeatedly echoing Sihanouk's line that no political compromise is possible with the Lon Nol government. They also continue to insist that they are not interested in any cease-fire for Cambodia that might be included in an agreement between Washington and Hanoi.

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SOMALIA-LIBYA: President Qadhafi reportedly has canceled plans to provide economic aid to Somalia because of his objection to Soviet influence with the Mogadiscio government.

the Libyans believe that, despite their attempts to persuade Somalia to loosen its ties with the USSR, the Soviet position in Somalia has improved in the past several months and that Tripoli's only recourse is to refuse aid to Somalia and to encourage other Arab governments to do the same. As a result of Somali President Siad's visit to Tripoli last January, Libya reportedly had promised to establish a joint shipping line and to extend a loan, perhaps amounting to as much as \$19 million, for the construction of an airport and other projects.

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The Soviets, long Somalia's principal source of arms, have considerable influence in Mogadiscio. Siad recently strengthened his control of the government, in part by purging opponents and sending them to the Soviet Union; this may have nudged him even closer to Moscow. Nevertheless, the Mogadiscio government often exhibits its dissatisfaction with its close association with Moscow.

Without Libyan aid the Somalis may become even more dependent on the Soviet Union and on China, their other principal Communist benefactor. Despite a slight improvement in the economy last year, Somalia remains heavily dependent on foreign aid. Assistance from Western sources has diminished since the military seized power in 1969, largely as a result of the regime's unfriendly posture toward the West.

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